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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Defendant contends that the issue of residency, as it relates to jurisdiction, should not be
considered by the Court because that issue was not specifically identified in the docketing
statement or notice of appeal. However, both the docketing statement and the notice of appeal
address the issue of jurisdiction, which is the issue on appeal. The difference between the
docketing statement and the brief is that Plaintiff subdivided the issue of jurisdiction into two
parts for purposes of argument in the brief. Both arguments concerning jurisdiction have been
raised throughout this litigation. Defendant had ample notice of the issues presented by Plaintiff
in her brief.
Even if Plaintiff were required to subdivide the jurisdiction issue in her docketing
statement, that would not be fatal error with regard to the residency issue. State and federal case
law proscribe that the merits of an appeal be heard and not dismissed because of technical
defects. Defendant makes no claim that the alleged defect in the docketing statement unfairly
prejudiced him for purposes of responding to the issues on appeal. Therefore, this Court should
not deny Plaintiff the opportunity to argue the merits of her appeal.
Finally, with regard to the docketing statement issue, if the Court determines that the
docketing statement is defective, Plaintiff requests leave of the Court to amend the docketing
statement to subdivide the jurisdictional issue in order to separately identify the issue as it relates
to residency and to the location where the cause of action arose.
Defendant's assertion that Utah's long-arm statute does not extend jurisdiction over him
is erroneous. Defendant's repeated acts, on record in this case, clearly fall within the scope of
the enumerated activities in Utah's long-arm statute. Further, his long history of both business
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and marital contacts in the state of Utah make it reasonable and fair for him to foresee being
brought into court in this state.
REPLY TO APPELLEE'S ARGUMENTS
I,

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT HAD IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION
BECAUSE THE PARTIES RESIDED IN THE MARITAL RELATIONSHIP,
WITHIN THE STATE OF UTAH, IS AN ISSUE PROPERLY BEFORE THIS
COURT AND SHOULD BE HEARD ON APPEAL.
A.

Rule 9 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Rule 9 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure governs the contents of the docketing
statement. Subsection c(5) directs, in part, that the docketing statement include "the issues
presented by the appeal, expressed in the terms and circumstances of the case, but without
unnecessary detail." It further directs that "the questions should not be repetitious." Utah R.
App. P. 9c(5). Plaintiff complied with both the letter and the spirit of Rule 9. The rule
discourages unnecessary detail or repetition because "the docketing statement is not meant to be
a brief or to present arguments." Utah R. App. P. 9(b). Nor is it intended for use by the
Appellee, but by the Court in processing the appeal. Nelson v. Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d 568, 572
(Utah 1996).
The issue of jurisdiction was argued below and subsequently included in Plaintiffs
docketing statement and brief for this appeal. While she subdivided the issue of jurisdiction into
two separate questions for purposes of the brief, she did not raise any new issue. In fact,
Plaintiffs arguments in favor of exercising jurisdiction over Defendant have remained the same
throughout this litigation. This accounts for the actual reference to the residency issue in the
docketing statement itself. (See EXHIBIT Rl)
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The notice of appeal states that "the appeal is taken from such part of the Judgment that
dismisses all issues except for the issue of divorcing the parties themselves. (See EXHIBIT R2)
This logically includes the issue of residency argued before the trial court. It follows that
Defendant had more than adequate notice as to the arguments raised on appeal. Accordingly,
Defendant has not been unduly prejudiced, nor has he claimed such.
B.

Any alleged defect in the docketing statement does not warrant this Court
dismissing the issue of residency as a basis for jurisdiction.

Even if Rule 9 required that Plaintiff specifically include the residency argument in the
docketing statement, this would not preclude the Court from hearing that issue on appeal.
Subsection (b) of Rule 9 directs that the docketing statement is intended for use by the Court in
assigning, classifying, prioritizing and calendaring cases. Accordingly, any deficiencies in the
docketing statement would be raised by the Court and not by the Defendant.
To deny Plaintiff the opportunity to argue the merits of her appeal based on Defendant's
dissatisfaction with the docketing statement would run contrary to well established policy and
case law. Both the Utah Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit have ruled on this issue. In
particular, the Utah Supreme Court resolved that even where an appellant failed to list all of the
issues for review in his docketing statement, it did not affect his right to raise the issues on
appeal since they were thoroughly discussed in his brief. Nelson v. Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d
568 (Utah 1996).
Similarly, the Tenth Circuit acknowledged the policy regarding defects in procedure and
the effect of these defects on an appeal. That court announced that, while practitioners are
expected to carefully comply with procedural rules, "case law interpreting those rules is founded
upon a policy which favors deciding cases on the merits as opposed to dismissing them because
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of minor technical defects." Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Co. v. Union Pacific
Railroad Co.. 119 F.3d 847 (10th Cir. 1997). Plaintiff should be allowed to argue the merits of
her appeal despite Defendant's dissatisfaction with the form of her docketing statement.
Finally, if there is a defect in the docketing statement, Plaintiff requests that this Court
exercise its authority under Rule 2 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure to permit Plaintiff to
amend the docketing statement to correct that defect.
II.

UNDER THE TWO-PART INQUIRY IN KAMDAR. THE TRIAL COURT HAD
PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER THE DEFENDANT.
Defendant contends that under the two-part inquiry, outlined in Kamdar & Company v.

Larav Company, 815 P.2d 245 (Ut. App. 1991), Utah lacks jurisdiction over him. Yet,
Defendant has purposefully availed himself of activities and privileges that satisfy the
requirements for asserting jurisdiction under Utah's long-arm statute. Consequently, it is not
unreasonable for him to foresee being hailed into court here.
Defendant, in his brief, properly identified the two-step analysis in Kamdar. First, claims
against the person must arise from the activities enumerated in UCA §78-27-24, and second, the
defendant's contacts must be sufficient to allow jurisdiction to be exercised without violation of
due process. Kamdar & Company, 815 P.2d at 248. However, Defendant failed to mention that,
as recently as 1998, the Legislature amended §78-27-24, and replaced the language "arising
from" with "arising out of or related to," effectively expanding the basis for exercising the
State's jurisdictional powers. Accordingly, Defendant's repeated activities within Utah,
including work, (R. at 27-28), membership in a Utah union, (R. at 29-30), hospitalization, (R. at
29), use of alcohol, (R. at 106 pages 13-17), and temporary residence for extended periods of
time in the marital relationship, (R. at 28-29), fit squarely within the enumerated acts giving rise
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to personal jurisdiction under §78-27-24. The clear trend, as evidenced by the Legislature's
recent amendment, is to favor the exercise of jurisdiction over nonresidents in cases such as this
one.
Utah's exercise of jurisdiction over Defendant will not violate the due process clause of
the U.S. Constitution. Defendant is not deprived of due process by being hailed into court in a
state in which he purposefully and repeatedly worked, stayed, and visited over a number of years.
His work activities alone, coupled with his membership in the local union, make it foreseeable
that he might be hailed into court within the State of Utah. Similarly, maintaining an action in
the same state will not place an undue hardship on the Defendant. Contrary to Defendant's
argument, it makes no difference, for purposes of §78-27-24, that his assets and actual domicile
are in the state of Idaho. Utah's long-arm statute was intended to apply in precisely this
situation.

Finally, Defendant urges this Court to adopt a definition of "reside within the

marital relationship" under §78-27-24 that mirrors the definition of residency under §30-3-1(2).
However, §30-3-1(2) requires actual and bona fide residency for purposes of exercising subject
matter jurisdiction, whereas, §78-27-24 requires only that the a person "resided within the
marital relationship, within this state" for purposes of establishing the minimum contacts
necessary for in personam jurisdiction over non-residents. Subject matter jurisdiction and in
personam jurisdiction are two distinct forms of jurisdiction, requiring different standards. They
are set forth in two different sections of the Code. The definition of residency, in one section,
can not be adopted for purposes of the other, without effectively changing the law as originally
drafted. Had the Legislature intended that a non-resident, in a divorce proceeding, be an actual
and bona fide resident, it could have drafted or subsequently amended the language to that effect.
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Since it has not, Defendant's request that this Court adopt the same definition of residency for
both sections should be denied.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff complied with Rule 9. Defendant had adequate notice of the issues on appeal;
the issues have not changed from those mentioned to the court below. Defendant is attempting to
dispose of Plaintiff s ability to argue the merits of her appeal based on a technicality. Nowhere
in his response does Defendant claim that the alleged deficiency in the docketing statement
unfairly prejudices his ability to respond to the issues. Defendant does not cite to any case law
on point that indicates that an issue is deemed to have been waived based on an appellee's
dissatisfaction with the docketing statement. Therefore, the issue of residency, as it pertains to
jurisdiction, should be heard and decided by this Court.
Defendant's analysis of Utah law regarding long-arm jurisdiction is erroneous because
Defendant's activities fall well within the scope of enumerated acts justifying the exercise of
personal jurisdiction over non-residents. Likewise, Defendant's numerous contacts with the
State make it reasonable for him to expect to be hailed into a Utah court. Accordingly, the trial
court would not violate Defendant's due process rights by exercising personal jurisdiction over
him. This case fits squarely within the activities contemplated to give rise to long-arm
jurisdiction under UCA §78-27-24.
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Based on the foregoing, the trial court's Order dismissing the Plaintiffs Complaint
should be set aside and the Plaintiff should be permitted to proceed to a trial on the merits in the
State of Utah to resolve the remaining issues between the parties.
DATED this Jd?L day of _ _ 6 ^ r ^ r

, 1999.

GALLIAN, WESTFALL, WILCOX & WRIGHT
I, G. Michael Westfall, certify that on May , 1999,1 served two copies of the attached
Reply Brief of Appellant upon LaMar J. Winward, the counsel for the Appellee in this matter, by
mailing it to him by first class mail with sufficient postage prepaid to the following address:
LaMar J. Winward
150 North 200 East, #204
St. George, Utah 84770
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GALLIAN, WESTFALL, WILCOX & WRIGHT
G. MICHAEL WESTFALL #3434
59 South 100 East
St. George, UT 84770
(435)628-1682
Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH

MARGARET LUCILE LENT,
DOCKETING STATEMENT
Plaintiff,
vs.

NORMAN FLOYD LENT,

Civil No. 981568-CA
Judge

Defendant.

Pursuant to Rule 9, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Plaint/Appellant Margaret Lucille
Lent, hereby submits her Docketing Statement.
1 DA TE OF ENTR Y OF JUDGMENT OR ORDER APPEALED FROM.
Order of Dismissal, entered August 3, 1998
2. NA TURE OF POST-JUDGMENT MOTION(S) AND DA TE(S) FILED.
There have been no post-judgment motions filed.
3. DATE OF FILING OF NOTICE OF APPEAL.
The Notice of Appeal was filed on September 1, 1998.

EXHIBIT

R-l

4. JURISDICTION:
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to §78-2a-3(h),
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended.
5. NAME OF TRIAL COURT OR AGENCY:
This appeal is from an Order of Dismissal entered by the Fifth Judicial District Court
in and for Washington County, State of Utah, the Honorable James L. Shumate, presiding. Said
Order of Dismissal dismissed all of Plaintiff s claims in a divorce proceeding except her request that
the marriage be terminated. The Fifth District Court ruled that, although it had jurisdiction over the
marriage and could therefore dissolve the same, it had no jurisdiction over Defendant.
6. STA TEMENT OF FACTS:
Plaintiff filed a Verified Complaint for Divorce in this matter on May 14, 1997.
Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction on or about September 10, 1997,
claiming that he had not resided in Utah with Plaintiff during their marriage.
In response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant had
lived and worked in Utah on several occasions during the marriage while he worked on projects in
this state. Plaintiff also alleged that one of the differences between the parties that resulted in the
action for divorce was Defendant's marital infidelity which occurred in Utah while he was working
and living in this state.
Plaintiff also claimed that Defendant had stayed at her residence in Utah on several
occasions since she moved here in 1992, but she acknowledged they had not shared the same bed
during those stays.
2
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At a hearing held on November 10, 1997, the Trial Court denied the Motion to
Dismiss.
As he was permitted to do, Defendant renewed his Motion to Dismiss on June 16,
1998, this time supported by his Affidavit, claiming that he had not engaged in any extra-marital
relationship within the State of Utah.
Plaintiff responded to this Second Motion to Dismiss by acknowledging that she
could not prove that Defendant's acts of infidelity occurred within the borders of the State of Utah,
but maintained that he was living in Utah when the infidelity occurred.
At the hearing on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, which was combined with a
hearing on Plaintiffs Motion o Bifurcate, Plaintiff testified that grounds for the divorce included
differences arising out of Defendant's excessive use of alcohol and that he had committed those acts
in Utah. The Court granted the Motion to Bifurcate, finding that it had jurisdiction over the
marriage, but also granted the Motion to Dismiss, ruling that Defendant did not have sufficient
contacts with Utah for the Court to determine any issues other than dissolution of the marriage. This
appeal followed that Order of Dismissal.
7. ISSUE FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW:
A. ISSUE:
Did the Trial Court err by ruling that Utah does not have jurisdiction over
Defendant where acts that created the irreconcilable differences that exist between the parties and
which were relied on in granting the Decree of Divorce occurred in the State of Utah?
B. STANDARD OF REVIEW:
3
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The standard of review of this appeal is de novo because the issue of
jurisdiction is one of law. See Liska v Liska. 902 P.2d 644, 646-47 (Utah App. 1995); Holm v
Smilowitz. 840 P.2d 157, 160 (Utah Ap 1992).
8. DETERMINA TION OF CASE BY SUPREME COUR T:
Not applicable—the Court of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction over this
appeal.
9. DETERMINA TIVE LA W\
U.C.A. §78-27-24(6)
10. RELA TED APPEALS:
None.
11. ATTACHMENTS:
a.

Bifurcated Decree of Divorce filed August 11, 1998.

b.

Order of Dismissal filed August 3, 1998.

c.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in Re: Bifurcated Decree of

Divorce, filed August 11, 1998.
c.

Notice of Appeal filed September 1, 1998.

DATED thiss

Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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GALLIAN, WESTFALL, WILCOX & WRIGHT
G. MICHAEL WESTFALL #3434
59 South 100 East
St. George, UT 84770
(435)628-1682
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Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MARGARET LUCILE LENT,
NOTICE OF APPEAL
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.

NORMAN FLOYD LENT,

Civil No. 974500368
Judge James L. Shumate

Defendant/Respondent.

Notice is hereby given that Plaintiff/Appellant, Margaret Lucille Lent, by and through her
attorney of record, G. Michael Westfall of the law firm of GALLIAN, WESTFALL, WILCOX &
WRIGHT, hereby appeals to the Utah Court of Appeals the final Order of Dismissal of the
Honorable James L. Shumate entered in this matter on August 3,1998. The appeal is taken from
such part of the Judgment that dismisses all issues except for the issue of divorcing the parties
themselves.
DATED this

_^
fo4 day of

ItyftfoliA/^

, 1998.

GALLIAN, WESTFALL, WILCOX^ WRIGHT

